Corruption within public-private partnership for infrestructure development: the wake of Odebrecht in Mexico

Abstract

The Mexican State fails to the fight against corruption. With regard to investment projects, it has made no progress in hampering illicit transactions between political and economic elites; rather, it has favoured such contacts hence wider sectors of society cannot reach the benefits of the projects. Long-standing accommodative, authoritarian institutions, as well as dubious conducts of public servants lie at the root of the issue, which appears unbeatable nowadays. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the institutional or meta-institutional aspects linked with performances of government representatives —mainly, when interacting with economic actors— to then propose policy alternatives that reorient decisions towards the public interest. This article examines the Ethylene XXI case study, a public-private partnership agreed by the Mexican government and the Brazilian Odebrecht Corporation through its filial Braskem. The case is relevant for it triggered unprecedented debate around corruption in Mexico and certainly in Latin America. The results, obtained by means of a qualitative-and-quantitative methodology, suggest that corruption damages the positive side of public-private partnerships. An autonomous anti-corruption system vested with equitable citizen participation, and a government committed to put transparency and general well-being to the fore, would allow achieving better governance.