Capacidad Estatal Local Asimétrica de la Ciudad “Autónoma” de Buenos Aires (1994–2025): Un Leviatán de Brazo Corto y una Policía Propia sin Justicia Ordinaria

Abstract

The political autonomy granted to the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA) by the 1994 constitutional reform was institutionalized asymmetrically. This article argues that between 1994 and 2025 the city rapidly consolidated its own coercive and fiscal capacities —the City Police and the Public Revenue Administration— while the transfer of ordinary justice proceeded slowly, fragmentarily, and incompletely. This asymmetry of capacities produced a penal bottleneck whose most visible symptom is the critical overpopulation of holding cells and police stations between 2020 and 2025. Through a historical reconstruction of the capital question, an institutional analysis of the transfer laws and agreements, and disaggregated budgetary and operational evidence, the article shows that Buenos Aires autonomy operates today as a short-armed Leviathan: it detains with local authority, but judges and confines under federal dependence. The hypothesis engages with Oszlak’s framework of state issues, positions, and courses of action, and provides evidence for rethinking the relationship between subnational stateness, federalism, and the penal cycle. The 2024 “Ferrari v. Levinas” ruling opens a new scenario still under dispute.