



Analysis of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs' Impact on the Restructuring Projects of Peru's National Coca Company

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Abstract

International treaties are pivotal in molding and directing national policies. By creating a binding normative framework, they influence government decisions, and consequently, the structure of institutions, affecting various national actors. In that vein, this study aims to elucidate the impact of the international narcotics regime, with a specific focus on the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (hereafter referred to as the Single Convention) promoted by the United Nations (UN), on the restructuring efforts of the Peru's National Coca Company (ENACO) from 2001 to 2023. To achieve this goal, a qualitative methodology was employed, leveraging the usefulness and relevance of document analysis and interviews, the latter validated by experts specializing in research methodology, ENACO's restructuring, and the international narcotics regime. The study ultimately finds that, despite the Single Convention's binding nature for the Peruvian State, its provisions did not significantly impact ENACO's restructuring efforts during the specified period. This, due to the fact that internal factors such as political, administrative and financial, had a greater influence on this process.
Key Words— National Coca Company; 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; Drug Policy; Peru.

Resumen

Los tratados internacionales son centrales formando y direccionando políticas nacionales. Al establecer un marco normativo obligatorio, afectan las decisiones gubernamentales y, en consecuencia, la estructura de instituciones, impactando a diversos actores domésticos. Este estudio analiza el efecto del régimen internacional de drogas, enfocándose en la Convención Única de Estupefacientes de 1961 (en adelante, Convención Única) impulsada por la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) sobre la reestructuración de la Empresa Nacional de la Coca (ENACO) desde 2001 hasta 2023. Para ello, utiliza una metodología cualitativa, aprovechando la revisión documental y entrevistas, estas últimas validadas por expertos especializados en metodología de investigación, reestructuración de ENACO y régimen internacional de estupefacientes. El estudio concluye que, a pesar de la obligatoriedad de la Convención Única para el Estado Peruano, sus disposiciones no impactaron los esfuerzos de reestructuración de ENACO durante el período estudiado. Esto debido a factores internos como políticos, administrativos y financieros tuvieron una mayor influencia en dicho proceso.
Palabras Clave— Empresa Nacional de la Coca; Convención Única de Estupefacientes de 1961; Política Antidrogas; Perú.

1 Introduction

The global challenge of drug trafficking, recognized as a non-traditional threat to international security, requires state collaboration to manage its implications. The international drug control regime, particularly the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

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(hereafter referred to as the Single Convention) promoted by the United Nations (UN), sets the coca leaf within Schedule I of narcotics (alongside cocaine and morphine). This regime is especially relevant in Peru, a country with deep-rooted cultural traditions and medicinal uses of coca leaf, and the highest production of illegal cocaine globally. This study seeks to answer how the Single Convention has shaped ENACO's restructuring projects from 2001 to 2023, illuminating the complex relationship between global drug policy and national governance in Peru. The year 2001 marks a significant shift due to the events of September 11, 2001, which reconfigured international security strategies, linking drug control with anti-terrorism efforts. This period also saw Peru's negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with the United States (U.S) as well as the replacement of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) with the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), promoting economic development in exchange for anti-drug cooperation (Congreso de la República, 2002).

The international drug control framework has been extensively criticized for its stern prohibitionist position, which often disregards cultural traditions and exacerbates economic and political challenges in drug-producing regions. Many scholars state that the Single Convention's inclusion of the coca leaf reflects a bias shaped by the geopolitical interests of Western powers during the Cold War. Their research highlights how these policies, framed in the "War on Drugs" initiated by the U.S., have contributed to militarization, dependency, and limited state autonomy in drug-producing countries, such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru (Colson, 2019; Musto, 1999). Particularly in the Peruvian context, studies by Cotler (1999) and Torres (2013) argue how foreign-driven drug policies have excluded local voices, resulting in policies that often lack public debate and practical adaptability. Coca National Company (ENACO in Spanish)'s restricted capacity to manage Peru's coca trade effectively appear as a crucial point in these discussions, underlying the institutional and economic limitations of a state-monopolized regulatory approach in a globalized market (Durand, 2005; Manrique, 2022).

To explore the influence of the Single Convention on ENACO's restructuring projects, this study will utilize a qualitative method. Primary data will be gathered through interviews with key actors which will offer insights into the operational challenges and political dynamics. These key actors are ENACO officials, coca growers, policymakers, and representatives from other Peruvian anti-drug agencies. Secondary sources, for example, policy documents, ENACO's reports, historical trade agreements, and academic analyses, will complement these findings to contextualize the historical and geopolitical pressures that frame Peru's coca policy. By analyzing firsthand testimonies with secondary data, this study will assess the efficacy and limitations of ENACO's restructuring projects over the last two decades.

Our findings reveal that during the period from 2001 to 2023, the provisions of the Single Convention did not have a significant impact on the restructuring projects of ENACO. This is because other domestic factors, such as political, administrative, and financial considerations, had a much stronger influence on the restructuring demands and the outcomes of these projects. However, this does not undermine the need to reinterpret international drug conventions to achieve more participatory, open, and evidence-based consultation spaces. In today's global context, marked by regional disintegration, increased protectionism, and the rise of authoritarian governments, it is imperative to revive the principles of institutional neoliberalism to forge binding agreements that lead to effective solutions

in response to international security threats, such as illicit drug trafficking.

This manuscript is organized into five sections after the introduction. The first section introduces the study's focus, settling the basis to understand the institutional dynamic of ENACO, and also main concepts of international relations such as decolonization processes and international drug, which be detailed in the next sections. The second section offers a research background seeking to explain the broad literature on context of international drug regime and Peruvian relationship with the coca leaf from a historical and critical perspective to prohibitionist policies. The third section outlines the methodology, describing the qualitative approach, specifying the research techniques and population sample. The fourth section presents the analysis (results) of both primary and secondary sources, detailing ENACO's operational limitations and the institutional implications of current national and international policies in Peruvian autonomy and future reform possibilities of the regime. Finally, the fifth section offers recommendations for ENACO's restructuring and proposes directions for further research on coca policy reform.

2 Drugs, policies and interests

The Single Convention mandates strict measures for states, including the elimination of coca chewing within 25 years, authorization of coca use solely for medical and scientific purposes, creation of official institutions for production regulation, and regular reporting to a supervisory committee. Additionally, public policies to combat illicit drug trade are rooted in foreign policy directives, stemming from Peru's adherence to international conventions promoted by Western countries since the mid-20th century. These policies were not widely debated in Peruvian public forums, with the media and public opinion in the late 1970s instead focusing on democratic restoration and economic crises (Cotler, 1999, p. 141). Such policies often resulted from insular negotiations and geopolitical interests favorable to the national interests of the conventions' promoting countries, shaped by the Cold War's bipolar division.

The decolonization processes post-World War II in Africa and Asia highlighted former European colonies' disinterest in opposing the US prohibitionist stance, which favored US hegemony and Nixon's 'War on Drugs' initiated in the early 1970s (Colson, 2019). Some opinions suggest that this project carried puritanical, proselytizing and racist traits towards drugs used by ethnic minorities, in order to establish monopolies over pharmaceutical substances (Musto, 1999). Western drugs were legal for their medical potential, while Third World drugs were banned for traditional use and considered practically useless (Richard, 1995). Tobacco and alcohol, other psychoactive substances, were not subject to international control comparable to opium, given their acceptance and corporate backing in the West since the early 20th century (Paoli et al., 2012).

Despite nearly fifty years of adherence, statistical reports, academic studies, and informal market participants highlight ENACO's shortcomings, despite increased demand for coca leaf for traditional and industrial purposes. For instance, ENACO's purchases decreased from 2008 to 2018, covering only 7 of 11 authorized areas and reaching only 8% of the possible 81 tons annually. The bureaucratic nature of ENACO and inflexible policies further hinder its effectiveness. It operates as a state-owned monopoly, with fixed annual prices regardless of market variations, hostile relations with producers, corruption, inefficiency, and political manipulation (Durand, 2005). These issues are exacerbated by

its strict regulatory framework, discouraging continuity and preventing new traders' incorporation due to an outdated registration system constrained by Law 22095 (Manrique, 2022).

Various proposals to strengthen ENACO and reduce illicit trade include balancing legal demand and supply, updating registries, and including new authorized actors (Durand, 2005). Coca growers' unions also criticize ENACO's institutionality and foreign interference in national policy, viewing it as a threat implemented by international agents (Zevallos & Mujica, 2013). Since 1947, ENACO has undergone reforms concerning its place within state institutions. Various restructuring initiatives have been proposed to improve its operational capacities. For example, in 2001, Alto Huallaga farmers participated in a Dialogue Table with the Ministry of the Interior, emphasizing the need to stop forced crop eradication and enact a coca leaf law distinct from the Drug Repression Law. In 2022, Prime Minister Aníbal Torres met with the Provincial Federation of Farmers, who demanded the urgent restructuring of ENACO and the purchase of all coca production, citing significant sales losses due to insufficient purchases and calling for the company's board to be composed of Cusco residents with headquarters relocated to Cusco.

3 Research Background

This section will give an analysis of the historical, political, and economic foundations shaping Peru's contemporary challenges with coca cultivation and drug policy. It is divided into four subsections: First, we will explore the international treaty that established the global drug control framework, highlighting its foundational role and its implications for Peru's policies and practices. Second, we will summarize the U.S.-led global anti-drug campaign, emphasizing its geopolitical motivations, operational strategies, and the profound impacts on Latin American policies, particularly in Peru. Third, we will focus on the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), analyzing how trade mechanisms were linked to anti-drug strategies and the challenges they posed to balancing economic growth with cultural and social considerations. And finally, we will examine the structural and operational challenges faced by ENACO as it navigates the dual pressures of complying with international mandates while addressing domestic realities and local demands.

3.1 The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

The Single Convention drafting began in 1948 when the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) approved a U.S.-sponsored resolution initiated by Anslinger, aiming to replace treaties from the 1912 Hague Convention (Bewley-Taylor et al., 2016). The Single Convention had three main goals: limit raw material production, codify existing conventions, and simplify the drug control machinery. From 1950 to 1958, the document underwent three drafting stages. The first draft, led by Leon Steinig, was rejected in 1955 due to its association with the International Opium Monopoly scheme. The second draft, tied to the 1953 Opium Protocol by Anslinger and Charles Vaille, was deemed ineffective due to "multiple paths" and "conflicting clauses" (McAllister, 2004). The third draft, completed by Robert Curran between 1957 and 1958, led to the participation of 73 states and various international organizations in a 1961 plenary session in New York (Bewley-Taylor

et al., 2016). It also consolidated several multilateral drug control treaties to expand the control system to include narcotic raw materials in international legislation. It maintained previous agreements' characteristics, such as recognizing medical use and requiring parties to submit estimates and statistical returns on drug needs, production, and trade. It included licensing requirements for manufacturers, traders, and distributors (Article 23), and maintained its supervisory nature but merged supervisory institutions into the current International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) without police authority (Bewley-Taylor et al., 2016).

The Single Convention emphasized humanitarian purposes and was the first treaty to mention addiction as a serious harm due to non-medical and non-scientific drug use. Article 4 required legislative and administrative actions regarding drug-related processes, seen as a special obligation (Chatterjee, 1981). Article 36 introduced criminal measures to punish serious drug-related offenses, opting for a moderate approach to achieve broad acceptance by the Parties. Ambiguity in defining "medical and scientific purposes" allowed states flexibility in applying criminal provisions, and Article 33 discouraged unauthorized possession without necessarily mandating severe punishments (Bewley-Taylor et al., 2016). This classification implicitly prohibits the coca leaf's religious, traditional, and industrial uses in Bolivia, Peru, northern Argentina, and Chile (Thoumi, 2004). This classification stemmed from a WHO report influenced by racial and nationality-based conceptions, which concluded without scientific evidence that coca chewing harmed individuals' intellectual and moral nature (Salgar, 2019). The Single Convention nullified the traditional coca use's epistemological value, obligating countries to prohibit non-Western scientific and medical practices (Sánchez Gonzáles, 2015).

The Convention also classified drugs into four schedules with varying control levels, placing the coca leaf in Schedule I. The Convention defined control bodies within the UN, confirming the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) as the policy-making body and establishing the INCB to oversee international regulations. The INCB, an independent quasi-judicial body of thirteen members elected by ECOSOC for five-year terms, limits narcotic production to medical and scientific needs and prevents illicit cultivation and trafficking (Bewley-Taylor et al., 2016).

This international regulation laid the groundwork for an international prohibitionist approach to drug control. This restrictive framework settled the stage for the War on Drugs, launched by the U.S in the 1970s, which embedded within national security agendas, particularly in Latin America, where coca cultivation was associated with the illicit cocaine trade. Consequently, producers' countries such as Peru faced external pressure to comply with the inflexible anti-drug agenda, often against local cultural practices and socioeconomic realities. This intersection between the Single Convention's rigid mandates and the War on Drugs' policies reshaped national policies, reducing Peru's capacity to manage coca production autonomously and to lead its own antinarcotic plans.

3.2 War on Drugs

Shortly after the Single Convention, the War on Drugs was promoted in 1971 as a global campaign with a rigorous and prohibitionist tone, aiming to deter the supply, demand, and consumption of illicit drugs through the threat of arrest and punishment. This policy also responded to the revolutionary political trends of the hedonistic 1960s, which challenged

family values and American Christianity (Linton, 2015). Developed within the Cold War's geopolitical context, it addressed U.S. domestic and foreign policy concerns (Alekseevich & Konstantinovich, 2019).

Externally, the U.S. faced social and political instability due to the Vietnam War, the lack of progress against communism in Southeast Asia, and growing protests at home. Authorities struggled to maintain order, as citizens' concerns shifted from communism to civil rights, equality, and quality of life (Alekseevich & Konstantinovich, 2019). The War on Drugs became the basis for ineffective anti-drug policies for two main reasons: targeting lower criminal group members while leaving major beneficiaries untouched and focusing solely on supply despite rapidly growing demand. Drug users were criminalized, suffering harsh consequences (Paoli et al., 2012).

Internally, the War on Drugs diverted attention from government errors during the Cold War's Detente. Clinton's administration continued this policy, viewing drugs as a threat to American democracy (Ambos, 1998, cited by Salgar, 2019). Reagan later used it to consolidate U.S. influence in Latin America and combat drug suppliers under the national security banner. This led to adverse institutional and political consequences in recipient states, such as Bolivia, where foreign intervention resulted in criminal policy militarization, repressive actions against indigenous activists, prison overcrowding, and increased violence and insecurity (Stippel & Serrano-Moreno, 2020).

The international drug regime's consolidation did not prevent the expansion of massive markets or the widespread distribution of heroin and injectable drugs (Paoli et al., 2012). According to Antonio Mario Costa, former head of the UNODC, the prohibitionist regime caused corruption, environmental damage, stigma and mistreatment of drug users, increased transnational crime, and violence (Costa, 2008). The Shafer Commission, appointed by Nixon in 1972, found that drug policy was ineffective, but its recommendations were ignored, and the War on Drugs continued with military tones and social fear (Linton, 2015).

After the Cold War finished, the War on Drugs influenced bilateral agendas with Washington. Countries that met U.S. conditions received financial aid and assistance programs, while those opposing faced sanctions (Alekseevich & Konstantinovich, 2019). The UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), established in 1971 with U.S. funding, coordinated Western aid to developing countries for crop substitution, law enforcement, and technical assistance (Paoli et al., 2012). In Bolivia, U.S. pressures influenced government actions. During president Jaime Paz Zamora's government in 1992, the U.S. conditioned military and financial assistance on Bolivia not presenting an amendment proposal to the Single Convention. Under Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada's government (1993-1997), the U.S. imposed conditions for unmet drug trafficking targets, including an extradition treaty, an eradication plan, and eliminating over 1,700 hectares in Chapare (Salgar, 2019).

The War on Drugs promoted by the U.S. has also had a traditional geopolitical character during the first decade of this century. It supported coca crop eradication with the objective of undermining the economic foundations of Colombian armed groups, while achieving greater intervention capacity in the countries of the so-called 'Bolivarian bloc' led by Hugo Chávez (Medina Rivas-Plata, 2012). Also, this international campaign extended its influence into economic policies, interlacing anti-drug efforts with trade incentives at the beginning of the last decade.

This approach culminated in initiatives like the ATPDEA, which gave preferential ac-

cess to American markets for Andean countries as long as these countries engage in the eradication of illicit coca cultivation and curbing drug trafficking. For Peru, the treaty served as both an opportunity and a challenge. In the next subsection, the study will show that it not only fostered economic growth through trade, but it also entrenched U.S. influence in shaping domestic anti-drug policies.

3.3 The Nature of ATPDEA and Its Role in the Fight Against Drugs

The ATPDEA figured as a trade regime based on the exemption of tariff payments granted unilaterally by the U.S to Andean Region countries: Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, to promote their exports to the U.S. market, generate jobs away from drug trafficking, fight drug trafficking, and promote the substitution of illicit coca crops (Organization, 2018). The ATPDEA project, which sought to expand the ATPA and its benefits, was presented in the House of Representatives by Representatives Bill Thomas and Phillip Crane and approved on November 16, 2001, by the House plenary and approved on August 1, 2001, by the Senate (Abad Merchán, 2010). Thanks to lobbying and advocacy promoted by CAN Member States through repeated trips to the U.S and interviews with leaders of the Ministries of Trade and Foreign Affairs, this optimal result was achieved for the beneficiary parties (Barreiro, 2002).

This mechanism was approved by the U.S Congress retroactively on December 4, 2001, translating into the reimbursement of tariffs paid – until August 6, 2002 – for Peruvian products to importers by U.S. Customs (Congreso de la República, 2002) benefited since 1991, the year in which ATPA was signed. Signed by President George Bush on August 6, 2002, ATPDEA would dispel the uncertainty of various actors due to the lack of ATPA renewal in 2001, proclaiming Peru eligible again on October 31, 2002 (Mansilla Núñez, 2005). Unlike ATPA, ATPDEA extends benefits to new products, though with quota limitations on garments as long as they are made with Andean materials and without quota limitations on garments made with maquila, tuna packaged in aluminum bags, and fine fabrics of alpaca, llama, and vicuña without quota limitations. Furthermore, ATPDEA does not exempt textiles and clothing from tariffs, except for the previously mentioned garments, alcoholic beverages like cane aguardiente and rum, canned tuna, and sugar, liquid concentrates, and sugary products (Mansilla Núñez, 2005).

It is worth noting that both ATPA and ATPDEA belong to the internal law of the U.S, meaning they are unilateral legal norms, which, while justified, are classified as special concessions. This characteristic prevents beneficiary countries, members of CAN, from requesting more benefits or fewer requirements, nor does it allow them to exert influence to modify their stipulations or the right to file claims in case the exported products do not meet ATPDEA conditions (Sotomayor Vértiz, 2005). Regarding the relationship of ATPDEA with the fight against drugs, it can be assured, in general terms, that this Agreement aims to mitigate the high economic and social costs assumed by beneficiary states under the principle of shared responsibility and strengthening the legitimate economy (Castrillón, 2007).

Between 2003 and 2006, the results in terms of reducing drug cultivation levels are optimal for the commercial and security sectors. During the mentioned period, there was an increase in beneficiary states' exports to the U.S. market by \$13.5 billion in 2006, as well as a maximum cultivation average of 157,000 hectares according to statistics provided

by ECLAC, the 2006 World Drug Report, and the U.S. Department of Commerce (Durán Lima, 2007). In sum, the ATPDEA, as a pillar of U.S.-led anti-drug strategies, had direct implications for Peru's domestic institutions in charge of both regulating and eradicating coca production, particularly ENACO, which was caught between external obligations and domestic interests. This dilemma could exemplify the challenges of reconciling international trade agreements with cultural significance of coca in Peru. In addition, it could exemplify the difficulties faced by national institutions in adapting to the dual imperatives of economic development and international commitments.

3.4 The National Coca Company (ENACO)

Even before the establishment of the Coca Monopoly in 1949 under President Manuel Odría's government, since the 1920s and 1930s, nationalist attempts to consolidate a monopoly for industrial purposes of the coca leaf and cocaine were overshadowed by the influence of the U.S. government and private sector (Gootenberg, 2004). In a post-World War II context, the punitive nature of drugs fit even more into the design of policies and creation of institutions, conceiving the Coca Monopoly as a company with regulatory functions over its various productive processes, such as planting, consumption, and distribution.

However, from its inception as an institution, it found itself at a crossroads regarding the purposes it should pursue as it sought to regulate the market on the one hand and prohibit the illicit market resulting from the transformation of coca leaf into cocaine on the other (Manrique, 2022). Subsequently, the UN's influence was reflected in the social condemnation of the coca leaf based on its recommendations to limit cultivation in the late 1950s. Then, ratification of the Single Convention only reinforced the Peruvian state's fight against coca production.

In this sense, Supreme Decree 254 established the identification of illicit cultivation zones throughout the national territory, totaling 16,000 hectares, which were controlled by the Coca Monopoly, which, in turn, issued licenses for wholesale and retail sales. This would be reinforced by the marketing regulatory framework, currently in force, established in Decree Law 22095 during the military government of General Francisco Morales Bermúdez in 1978, whose spirit was essentially to gradually eliminate coca cultivation throughout Peru as it prohibited providing technical or credit assistance to cultivated plots, entrusted the Ministry of Agriculture with implementing alternative development programs, and did not delimit licit cultivation zones (Glave & Rosemberg, 2005).

Additionally, this decree not only characterized by being exhaustive and multifaceted but also by having multi-sectoral institutions of the high political sphere responsible for its implementation (Cotler, 1999, pp. 140–141), which, in turn, arose from the increased illegal demand for cocaine during the 1970s (Thoumi, 2004). This law would replace the Coca Monopoly and exclusively grant ENACO control over the various productive processes of the coca value chain, even providing a maximum period of 90 days for the registration of producers by this company and the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, those not registered in the producer registry would be susceptible to facing penal processes ranging from 2 to 15 years according to said law (Manrique, 2022).

This census was considered a provisional measure with the objective of establishing transitional rights to cultivate coca while ENACO developed the production strategy that would guide the gradual elimination of plantations to eradicate illegal consumption, re-

sulting in the current characteristics of small plots with cultivation areas of less than one hectare, i.e., less than 10,000 m². However, the impossibility of suppressing coca cultivation and the growing demand for cocaine in the U.S and Europe were decisive for the state to opt for other public policies (Cotler, 1999, pp. 141–141).

Although this regulation would continue to be applied due to the various criticisms of coca cultivation to reduce its legal demand to the minimum possible through the implementation of numerous requirements and licenses for producers and traders (Manrique, 2022), other public policies would be implemented at the national level, such as the Alternative Development Programs (PDA). At the international level, policies such as the Andean Cooperation Program and Plan Colombia would be implemented. Despite these programs are beyond the scope of this research, the aforementioned author states that these programs contributed to the sector's growth since the 1990s, while coca plantations in Peru fell by 69%, they grew by 54% in Colombia, and from 1987 to 1997, the number of beneficiaries of the PDA in Peru doubled (Manrique, 2022).

Likewise, the implementation of the first programs under this logic of collaboration is described. Thus, projects like Alternative Crop Replacement (CRO) and the Integrated Development Project (PDI), although faced with the challenges of the absence of markets and the need to offer producers sufficient compensation for their crops, would serve as a basis for the implementation of later projects such as the Alternative Development Program in the Alto Huallaga Valley, which would also experience the challenge of providing infrastructure to the Valley. Similarly, during this period, the public interest also concentrated on reducing illegal crops due to concerns about economic growth, as these programs had a market-focused approach (Torres Agurto, 2013).

However, it was not until 2001 that significant restructuring projects within ENACO were initiated due to political events related to the reconfiguration of international security priorities and strategies worldwide following the events of September 11 in the U.S. For example, the most recent report by the High-Level Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (DEVIDA) reports that, as of 2021, the number of registered producers of the coca leaf has doubled in less than 15 years since 2007 (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas-DEVIDA, 2020). It is worth noting that despite criticisms of ENACO due to its state-owned nature, this does not prevent it from being subject to restructuring processes as numerous state companies have undergone changes at the structural level, contributing to the modernization and optimal results of their objectives (Manrique, 2022). In this sense, Manrique (2022) argues that one of the most pressing issues related to the institutional framework of ENACO lies in the lack of flexibility in its registration and market control mechanisms.

In the case of ENACO, various restructuring proposals and processes have emerged from different sectors, such as agriculture, business, and even the state, due to the problems of this monopolistic activity, which ultimately result in complaints, lawsuits, and dissatisfaction from the involved parties. A relevant case in the business sector that illustrates this reality is the legal complaint filed with the Free Commission of the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) by the industrial companies ASA Alimentos S.A. and Comercial Holguón e Hijos, who denounced their bad practices (Manrique, 2022).

Faced with the social conflict between ENACO and the Provincial Federation of Farmers of La Convención, Yanatile, and Lares (FEPCACYL) that occurred in June 2018 in the

provinces of La Convención, Calca, and Paucartambo in the department of Cusco and recorded by the Ombudsman's Office, the historic demand of the coca growers' union was once again highlighted: the increase in the price of coca leaves and the reorganization of ENACO. Due to the lack of dialogue, a Technical Roundtable was convened on June 28 of the same year to address the coca marketing issue in Cusco, where it was mainly agreed to restructure ENACO through the establishment of another Technical Roundtable to specifically discuss this request in a Sub-Working Group endorsed by Ministerial Resolution No. 282 of 2021 from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM) (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2022).

Table 1: Major Public Administrative Reforms from 2001 to 2007

Year of Publication	Law Number	Law Name	Type of Law
2001	Law N° 27444	General Administrative Procedure Law	Administrative and Political Organization
2002	Law N° 27806	Transparency and Access to Public Information Law	Transparency
	Law N° 27658	General Modernization of Public Management Law	Administrative and Political Organization
2003	Law N° 27783	Decentralization Base Law	Administrative and Political Organization
	Law N° 27867	Regional Governments Base Law	
	Law N° 27972	Municipalities Base Law	
2004	Law N° 28411	Budget National System Base Law	Budgetary
	Law N° 28175	Public Service Employment Base Law	Civil Service
2005	Law N° 28522	Strategic Planning System Base Law	Planning
2006	Law N° 29158	Executive Branch Base Law	Administrative and Political Organization

Source: Author's elaboration on the timeline constructed by Ugarte Manani (2021)

As seen in Table 1, in 2012, Premier Oscar Valdés announced to the media the restructuring of ENACO with the aim of increasing prices for all types of coca leaves sold by farmers in Yanatile, La Convención, and Kosñipata, raising ten soles for first-quality coca, totaling 90 soles in payment from ENACO to the coca grower; ten soles for second-quality coca, totaling 85 soles in payment, and five soles of increase for third-quality coca. Similarly, another agreement from this meeting held at the Regional Government offices was the inclusion of a representative of coca producers on ENACO's Board of Directors, whose appointment would be formalized by National Fund for Financing State Business Activity (in Spanish: Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento de la Actividad Empresarial del Estado, FONAFE). In the same vein, Bill No. 3834 of 2022, which declares the restructuring and reconfiguration of ENACO as a public necessity and national interest, was registered by the current congressman, representative of the department of Cusco, Guido Bellido, who

exercises his legislative initiative according to Article 107 of the Political Constitution of Peru.

In November 2022, in order to improve both the administration and management of ENACO, this bill was proposed with an emphasis on benefiting coca growers and the necessary actions were assigned to FONAFE to solve the overstocking of more than one million kilos of coca by November 2022, which are distributed in the Cusco headquarters and in the rest of ENACO's premises throughout Peru, as they are classified as "not marketable in the traditional channel". Then, in February 2023, Congresswoman Katy Ugarte Mamani, representative of the department of Cusco, presented Bill No. 2086 to Congress, which proposed declaring the restructuring of ENACO as of national interest and public necessity due to ENACO's lack of liquidity and operability, which would affect the economies of thousands of households in Cusco dedicated to the legal production of coca leaves. Additionally, the congresswoman outlined the purposes of said restructuring: registering coca leaf producers, determining the total number of farms producing coca leaf crops, and controlling collection, drying, and transportation to prevent their diversion to illicit purposes (Ugarte Mamani, 2021).

This section has delineated the historical and geopolitical frameworks that foster Peru's current challenges with coca regulation and the restructuring of ENACO. Beginning with the Single Convention, the analysis explored its foundational role in shaping the international drug regime. The subsequent section about the War on Drugs outlined the operationalization of the strict norms via securitization strategies, with a heavy influence in Peruvian institutions. It was necessary to illustrate the ATPDEA treaty into the discussion to describe how trade agreements linked economic incentives to anti-drug policies. Eventually, the study outlines how ENACO faces operational and structural challenges because of the mandatory international regime and domestic interests. In order to unravel these dynamics further, the next section will describe the Methodology used in this study by combining qualitative interviews with key actors and secondary data on ENACO's performance and policy impacts.

4 Methods

This section details the research techniques, population sample, and variables employed to examine the impact of the international drug regime on ENACO's restructuring projects between 2001 and 2023. First, the research techniques include a review of academic articles, institutional reports, and news coverage, complemented by interviews with key actors to gain nuanced insights about the phenomena. Second, the population sample consists of academic experts and specialists from state institutions responsible for drug eradication efforts, whose perspectives provide both theoretical and practical dimensions to the analysis. Besides, the study employs both variables that enable a comprehensive examination of the relation between global policies and local institutional responses in Peru. The independent variable is the Single Convention, which establishes the regulatory and enforcement framework, while the dependent variable is the restructuring efforts of ENACO from 2001 to 2023.

4.1 Research Techniques

As we mentioned, this study will use personal interviews as the main technique for data collection due to the complexity of merely observing the phenomenon, without excluding the document review technique from the study. Using a semi-structured question and answer system, meanings of a phenomenon will be jointly constructed, and communication will be established between the interviewee and the interviewer (Janesick, 1998), allowing questions to be freely introduced to clarify mentioned terminology and gather more information.

The study population for this research includes high-ranking officials and former officials from public institutions responsible for the analysis and management of coca leaf in Peru, such as ENACO and DEVIDA. Additionally, the participation of opinion leaders from research circles, media, private institutions, and non-governmental organizations is included, as well as community leaders affiliated with nationally recognized coca growers' unions and federations (Table 2). The sample is non-probabilistic as generalizing the results is not a priority for the researcher. In this study, there is no intention to use statistically representative cases to draw conclusions. Therefore, a careful selection of cases with specific characteristics and of significant interest to the researcher is made due to the great richness they provide in collecting and analyzing data (Baptista et al., 2010). See the Appendix section for a more detailed information of interviewees (Table 6).

Table 2: Characteristics of the Interviewed Population

Sector	Institution	Functions
Public	ENACO DEVIDA	Take on technical and decision-making positions
Private	Media Think-Tanks Consulting Agencies	Analyze and exhibit illicit drug trafficking
Academia	Universities Research Groups	Research and publish on illicit drug trafficking
Community	Coca Trade Unions	Take on leadership positions

4.2 Variables

The independent variable focuses on the guidelines established by the 1961 Single Convention, which regulate the production, commercialization, and consumption of substances classified as narcotics, including the coca leaf. The dependent variable focuses on the restructuring projects of ENACO during 2000 and 2023, so this includes initiatives to improve its operational capacity, modify its management structures, and balance domestic and international demands within a legal framework. Table 3 exhibits the operationalization of variables for this study.

Table 3: Operationalization of Variables

Variable	Dimensions	Indicators	Research Technique
Legal Provisions of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs	Inspection System (Art. 23)	Performance of a single public entity Number of licenses granted to growers Land area of parcels authorized for cultivation Number of harvests delivered to National Coca Company	- Review of National Coca Company's single registry - Review of official reports - Interviews with coca grower associations
	Eradication System (Art. 27)	Number of wild crops uprooted Number of hectares with illicit crops eradicated	- Review of official databases
	International Narcotics Control Board's Information System (Arts. 19 and 20)	Number of hectares allocated for coca leaf cultivation Geographical location of coca leaf crops	- Review of reports submitted by the Peruvian State
National Coca Company's Restructuring Projects	Administrative	Workforce effectiveness	- Interview with former ENACO officials
		Re-registration requests	- Review of request lists
	Political	Participation of international actors in Program implementation	- Interviews with coca grower unions, officials, and former ENACO officials
		Incorporation of actors in decision-making	- Review of working groups and citizen demands
Financial	Adverse commercial results	- Review of statistical projections of collection purchase, and sale of coca leaf	

5 Analysis

This section explores the impact of the Single Convention on ENACO restructuring projects, analyzing its administrative, political, and financial effects. Specifically, it examines how the convention's legal provisions concerning inspection, eradication, and information systems have influenced ENACO's operations and strategic direction in the restructuring projects. In the administrative dimension, the inspection systems mandated by the Single Convention have entrenched bureaucratic inertia, as ENACO must navigate stringent oversight requirements and coordinate with domestic entities like PCM and DEVIDA to implement reforms.

In the political dimension, the eradication systems dictated by the Single Convention have created significant tension as Interviewee 3 (2023) states. While ENACO must align with prohibitionist policies inspired by the U.S.-led War on Drugs, it has also sought to assert national agency through legislative initiatives and policy boards. In the financial dimension, the information systems required by the Single Convention have imposed considerable burdens on ENACO, stretching its already limited resources. Reporting obligations and resource constraints have driven proposals for financial restructuring, such as loan exemptions through FONAFE and initiatives to expand industrial coca leaf use. Together, these dimensions illustrate the far-reaching impact of the Convention's provisions on ENACO, highlighting the challenges of aligning international compliance with national interests and operational efficacy.

From 2001 to 2023, thirteen ENACO restructuring projects were initiated by various state and community actors, focusing on better representation for coca farmers and reorganization of ENACO's administrative structure (Table 4). Notable projects include attaching ENACO to the PCM for holistic management (2003) and creating the National Coca Council (CONCOCA) to promote coca micro-businesses and combat clandestine production (2005). Among recent initiatives stand out then-Prime Minister Oscar Valdés announced ENACO's restructuring to promote differentiated regulation of coca and encourage its traditional and industrial use (2012).

Following social conflict among producers in Yanatile, La Convención, and Kosñipata (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2022), the PCM and the FEPCACYL formed a Technical Roundtable in 2021 to address ENACO's restructuring and strengthen its institutional framework. In 2019, legislators proposed updating coca producers' registration. After a strike in Quilabamba, the Coca Leaf Commercialization Supervisory Council was established to propose improvements in ENACO's commercialization and institutional framework (Resolution No.072-2021-PCM). ENACO's low market dominance in Peru is attributed to the lack of coordination between state entities. A private company seeking to import coca leaves faced difficulties due to ENACO's inefficiency and lack of support from national institutions).

5.1 Administrative effect on ENACO

One of the innovations of the Single Convention compared to previous drug treaties was the inclusion of coca leaf, poppy straw, and cannabis under existing controls on opium production. These controls required states maintaining production of these crops to create official agencies meeting medical and scientific needs (Thoumi, 2021). Article 23 of the

Table 4: ENACO's Restructuring Projects from 2001 to 2023

Date	Initiative	Context	Objectives of Projects
24/05/2001	Community-led Farmers of Alto Huallaga	Dialogue panel between producers and state authorities after a strike	Change composition of ENACO's board members and its main headquarters
22/02/2002	Executive-led	Law Project	Affiliate ENACO to Agriculture Sector
6/10/2003	Legislative-led Susana Higuchi	Law Project	Affiliate ENACO to the Primer Minister Office
2/06/2005	Legislative-led Emma Vargas de Benavides	Law Project	Create National Coca Council (CONCOCA) based on ENACO
3/09/2006	Community-led Coca-growing leaders	Meeting between producers and state authorities (Premier Jorge del Castillo, former leader and congresswoman Nancy Obregón)	Stop forced eradication of crops, remove NGOs from coca-growing areas, and reorganize state entities fighting against drug trafficking
4/05/2012	Executive-led Premier Oscar Valdés	Law Project	Promote discussion and enactment of a differentiated coca law
28/06/2018	Executive- and Community-led	Meeting with state authority (Premier Salvador del Solar)	Stop forced eradication of crops Install working subgroup to discuss ENACO's restructuring in technical roundtable
9/08/2019	Legislative-led Huilca Flores Indira	Law Project	Update coca registration for traditional or modern consumption and other purposes

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Date	Initiative	Context	Objectives of Projects
17/03/2021	Executive- and Community-led FEPACACYL* and PCM**	Meeting with state authority (Premier Guido Bellido Ugarte)	Create Supervisory Council to formulate restructuring proposal and improve ENACO's institutional framing
28/06/2022	Community-led FEPACACYL*	Meeting with state authority (Premier Anbal Torres Vásquez)	Appoint Cusco Regional Government and coca producers representatives to ENACO's Board of Directors
6/10/2022	Legislative-led Ruth Luque	Law Project	Declare of national and public interest ENACO's economic strengthening
22/12/2022	Legislative-led Guido Bellido Ugarte	Law Project	Declare of national and public interest ENACO's restructuring
24/02/2023	Legislative-led	Law Project	Declare of national and public interest ENACO's restructuring

* FEPACACYL: Federación Provincial Campesina de la Convención, Yanatile y Lares

** PCM: Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros (Prime Minister's Office)

Single Convention mandates the narcotics control system, describing the exclusivity of administrative performance governed by a single public agency, which, according to Interviewee 9 (2023) must designate permitted cultivation areas, issue licenses to producers, and monopolize import, export, and trade of the substance.

Then, Interviewee 8 (2023) noted that ENACO's business model stemmed from the developmental ideas of the 1960s and 1970s, where rulers aimed to control national resources independently. The creation of ENACO as an official entity to manage the legal coca leaf market recognizes the differentiation of its illegal use and the appreciation of its legal uses. Interviewee 2 (2023) described ENACO as a unique company trading a delicate product, managing the legal, industrial, and traditional use of coca leaf in Peru. Furthermore, Interviewee 4 (2023) provided a purist interpretation of the Single Convention, arguing that ENACO would be illegal under the Convention but operates legally at the national level due to Peruvian state regulation.

In this sense, Interviewee 2 (2023) noted the obsolescence of ENACO's information system, which lacked cost tracking for coca leaf production and marketing. "*ENACO's information system was obsolete, needing comprehensive reform*". ENACO's limited international influence reduces its capacity to impact global coca production. Interviewee 7 describes ENACO as "*an insignificant actor in the global production or industrialization of coca*". The INCB's (JIFE in Spanish) 2023 report urges Peru and Bolivia to resume monitoring territories affected by illicit crops, noting the significant growth of drug trafficking and the need for comparative monitoring (Junta Internacional de Fiscalización de Estupefacientes-JIFE, 2024).

Furthermore, ENACO's bureaucratic nature, due to its status as a state monopoly, leads to inefficiencies. Interviewee 2 (2023) highlights this issue, noting that ENACO's operations are slowed by adherence to public system norms, making project execution and market responsiveness cumbersome). This bureaucracy results in outdated regulations and a lack of business dynamism, reducing ENACO's competitiveness. The inefficiencies extend to the broader state-run business apparatus. Interviewee 8 notes that Peruvian public companies with monopolies, including ENACO, fail to manage resources effectively and often end up privatized. In addition, Interviewee 5 (2023) emphasizes the need for meritocracy in ENACO's leadership, critiquing the lack of professional qualifications among appointed managers.

Media coverage has also criticized the lack of experience among ENACO's leadership, appointed by FONAFE and PCM, which affects business management (Perú21, 2022). Interviewee 1 (2023) acknowledges the need for restructuring, proposing technical roundtables with FONAFE, PCM, and MEF to determine necessary measures. That is why, FEP-CACYL members, during technical roundtables convened by PCM in 2021, requested ENACO's restructuring to address managerial inefficiencies and frequent leadership changes. Interviewee 2 (2023) adds that many of ENACO's staff are politically appointed and over 60, making them resistant to necessary digital transformations.

5.2 Political effect on ENACO

The Single Convention also proposed a 25-year transition period to abolish coca leaf chewing. Interviewee 8 criticized the Single Convention for its lack of understanding of the complexities of the global drug problem, noting that the prohibition of coca leaf and its

required eradication within 25 years have not been fulfilled. This situation, according to Interviewee 9 (2023), has strengthened a global legal and political framework influencing drug-producing countries' policies. Article 36 of the Single Convention obligates signatory states, including Peru, to take necessary measures against illegal production processes of narcotics, considering any operation contrary to the provisions as an infraction or serious crime, punishable by deprivation of liberty (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime-UNODC, 2013, pp. 37–38). However, personal possession of drugs for consumption is not necessarily considered a serious crime (United Nations-UN, 1973, p. 428).

Interviewee 8 (2023) highlights the ineffectiveness of eradication processes in fighting drug trafficking, as they often lead to the displacement of coca leaf production to other territories, worsening economic conditions for vulnerable communities. *“Eradication simply causes displacement, punishing the poorest”*. Qualitative evidence and the SUR method support this, showing crop relocation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru from 1990 to 2009 (Raffo López et al., 2016).

Also, Interviewee 5 (2023) criticizes forced eradication for its harmful effects on people and alternative crops. *“Forced eradication has not produced results; it has been killing people and affecting alternative crops like yucca and cocoa”*. This aligns with interviewee's 1 (2023) view on the environmental misfit of alternative development programs, which fail without proper soil studies. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) monitors illicit markets and ensures states' commitments to control narcotics and eradicate coca chewing since December 12, 1989 (Thoumi, 2021). The lack of updated commercial information from ENACO hampers effective decision-making and compliance with INCB requirements.

Table 5: Hectares of Eradicated Crops by Department

Department	2021	2022
Cusco	-	-
Huánuco	991	5671
Junín	-	1202
Loreto	-	-
Madre de Dios	-	-
Pasco	-	-
Puno	1523	3759
San Martín	-	3183
Ucayali	3260	7812

Source: Special Project for the Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in the Upper Huallaga-CORAH (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas-DEVIDA, 2022)

There is a significant contradiction between national laws and international regulations, generating controversies in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Both Bolivia and Peru, with long traditions of coca leaf consumption, have rejected its criminalization and requested treaty reviews (The Transnational Institute, 2003). Article 27 of the Single Con-

vention oversees the eradication of wild and illicit crops. Despite including a paragraph in the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic to respect human rights and recognize traditional uses, this was insufficient to review the Single Convention's requirements (Chulver & Sanez, 2020). In 2021 and 2022, nationwide eradication efforts increased by over 15 thousand hectares, including new processes in Cusco, Junín, Loreto, Madre de Dios, Pasco, and San Martín (see Table 5).

5.3 Financial effect on ENACO

In addition, Interviewee 1 (2023) described the company's dual economic and social nature: *"ENACO is a company under FONAFE administration, aimed at profitability and social responsibility. We are boosting exports, seeking new customers for coca leaf and its derivatives"*. Interviewee 6 (2023) and Interviewee 8 (2023) highlight ENACO's incapacity to dominate the Peruvian market, making it financially unsustainable and unable to meet its objectives. ENACO's inability to buy all legal coca production and offer competitive prices exacerbates this issue, as noted by Interviewee 2 (2023). Despite a legal allowance of 12,000 hectares, ENACO historically only marketed 2,500 at its peak, failing to capitalize on international demand for the pharmaceutical market and leaving the illegal market undisturbed). Interviewee 5 (2023) explains that high prices and poor quality of ENACO's coca leaf compared to the illegal market further erode its market share. Interviewee 8 (2023) pointed out that the Convention's binding nature has weakened over time, with states' power and influence in the international order playing a more significant role, even in the economy field.

Furthermore, the proposal to liquidate the company and establish a new entity with a more business-oriented and less bureaucratic structure is not new in ENACO's restructuring processes, nor does it raise alarms within the international community. Interviewee 2 (2023) shared an analysis of the company's diagnostic report conducted during her tenure, which revealed more weaknesses than strengths. One of the identified issues was ENACO's obsolescence, compounded by financial and human resource challenges. A proposed solution was the liquidation and creation of a new company, which, although considered by FONAFE at the time, was sidelined due to political problems in December 2022, essentially, due to purely domestic matters. According to Interviewee 8, there would be an institutional inertia that would prevent these restructuring projects to be visible.

Coca grower organizations have submitted complaints to the UN about the negative impact of eradication processes, but they have received no response. The U.S, a main promoter of the Convention, currently prioritizes other geopolitical issues, reducing its involvement in Latin American drug policies according to Interviewee 7 (2023). In summary, the impact of the Single Convention on ENACO's restructuring from 2001 to 2023 was minimal due to the lack of international actors' participation, differing geopolitical interests, and bureaucratic inertia within ENACO. Internal challenges and the broader geopolitical landscape played a more critical role in shaping ENACO's restructuring efforts.

6 Conclusions

It is observed that during the period 2001 to 2023, the provisions of the Single Convention did not have a significant impact on the restructuring projects of ENACO. This is because

other domestic factors, such as political, administrative, and financial considerations, had a much stronger influence on the restructuring demands and the outcomes of these projects. Administrative factors, such as the company's internal management capacity, the effectiveness of implemented policies, and human resources management, also influenced how restructuring projects were carried out and their eventual results.

By understanding the conflicting interests and shared responsibility in the fight against drugs, a kind of bureaucratic inertia has been identified in ENACO, preventing it from unilaterally making decisions that could change the course of its actions. Domestic instances, such as PCM and DEVIDA, are the first to be consulted to evaluate the feasibility of restructuring measures, which involve assessing voluntary retirements of public officials, including more local representation on the Board, and having more appropriate profiles for managerial positions. Additionally, financial limitations, including incurred debts and resource availability, represented a constant challenge for ENACO, often promoting actors' interest in restructuring. Therefore, measures related to loan exemptions from FONAFE, promoting industrial coca leaf use to achieve higher returns in the national market, and facilitating regulations for insertion into the international market were proposed.

Although domestic political considerations, such as the prohibitionist agenda of institutions responsible for coca leaf management, whether in regulation (ENACO) or eradication (DEVIDA, MININTER), are inspired by the U.S. public policy of the War on Drugs, the reform proposals have not necessarily encountered obstacles from international actors. There has been considerable room for action manifested in the presentation of declarative reformist legislative projects and the formation of discussion and policy proposal boards without the participation of international institutions as actors. However, this does not undermine the need to reinterpret international drug conventions to achieve more participatory, open, and evidence-based consultation spaces.

In today's global context, marked by regional disintegration, increased protectionism, and the rise of authoritarian governments, it is imperative to revive the principles of institutional neoliberalism to forge binding agreements that lead to effective solutions in response to international security threats, such as illicit drug trafficking. In summary, although the Single Convention sets certain parameters and guidelines regarding the creation of an official body responsible for coca shrub commercialization to stop the production and distribution of narcotic substances like cocaine, the country's internal factors, such as political, administrative, and financial considerations, exerted a much stronger influence on ENACO's restructuring efforts.

The international drug control system lacks a periodic evaluation mechanism, contributing to its outdated nature and resistance to reforms. The UN National Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), evolved from the original Secretariat, manages funds and technical assistance for countries and broader issues like organized crime, terrorism, and human trafficking. The 1988 Convention's eradication measures reinforced this non-compliance, strengthening penal sanctions on controlled substances (Salgar, 2019; Thoumi, 2004). The international drug regime does not differentiate between natural and synthetic drugs in the same schedule, viewing the abolition of coca chewing as a cultural confrontation and a political debate obstacle (Thoumi, 2004). We consider that recognizing coca chewing in future Conventions would improve legal production and control over illegal market links.

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Appendix

Table 6: List of Interviewees, Their Institutional Affiliations, and Roles

Identifier	Sector	Institution	Name of Institution	Role at the Institution
Interviewee 1	Public	ENACCO		General Manager
Interviewee 2	Public	ENACCO		Former Public Servant
Interviewee 3	Public	DEVIDA		Former Director
Interviewee 4	Private	Think-Thank	CEDRO*	Public Servant
Interviewee 5	Community	Coca Trade Union	FEPACACYL**	Former Secretary
Interviewee 6	Private	Media	RGR Digital	Content producer
Interviewee 7	Private	Consulting Agency	Agro Andino	Director
Interviewee 8	Academia	University	PUCP***	Researcher
Interviewee 9	Academia	University	U. de los Andes	Researcher

* CEDRO: Centro de Información y Educación para la Prevención del Abuso de Drogas

** FEPACACYL: Federación Provincial Campesina de la Convención, Yanatile y Lares

*** PUCP: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú